Should Iranians Vote?

Should supporters of Iran’s democratic movement participate in the Presidential elections? If so, who should they support?

Image from here

Most Iranians consider participation to be the primary issue of this election. This is doubly true in the diaspora. Many Iranians, perhaps a majority, feel forlorn about elections as a strategy for democratization. Others are adamant that the electoral path remains legitimate.

Before assessing the various arguments, it is useful to lay out some underlying principles of how I think about Iranian politics. Political debates about Iran can run aground before the first sentence; simply because of different underlying priors about Iranian history.

Following from arguments of many others, I consider the current faction running the Islamic Republic to be a thin layer of the original 1979 revolutionary coalition. Although difficult to believe now, the original revolutionary coalition was extremely broad. It included essentially all political forces inside Iran except hardline monarchists. Hence, the paradox of 1979: the perplexing case of how a modernizing and industrializing strongman, leading a growing economy without any deep external or internal crises, managed to alienate everybody – to the point that even the old landowning aristocracy abandoned him.

But despite its broad base, the revolutionary republic has been completely usurped by the faction of Islamist elites centered around Khamenei. They have led a decades-long project that has methodically transformed the Islamic Republic by purging every other group from power.

What I label the ‘democratic movement’ refers to the wide constellation of forces that oppose the ongoing concentration of power around this faction. Within this loose ‘movement’ are an array of different, often contradictory, forces that may ultimate have different visions for their Iran. But the common thread is opposition to Khameneist domination.

So, how should Iranian democrats approach the election? This short essay sketches out arguments in favor of non-participation as well as arguments in favor of voting for Pezeshkian or Pourmohammadi (and maybe even Ghalibaf?).

1. Abstention

Opposition hardliners are adamant that Iranians should boycott elections in the Islamic Republic. Unfortunately, these arguments are almost exclusively moralist. Very few attempt to sketch out some kind of causal link between boycott and whatever outcomes they wish to see (whether it is revolution or some degree of empowerment for Iranian democrats).

Their strategic formula can be summarized as:

• Step 1: Boycott

• Step 2: ???

• Step 3: Revolution!

The abdication of strategic thinking among opposition hardliners is tragic. More so because hardliners in the diaspora are well-positioned to consider these issues (and then organize!) without worrying about reprisal from the IRI. Nonetheless, a few strategic approaches can be identified amongst the moralist morass of abstentionists.

The first approach is ‘accelerationism.’ The underlying idea here is that worse conditions create better outcomes. The more brutal and impoverished life becomes in the IRI, the more likely that revolution occurs. With regards to the election, accelerationists would probably prefer a brutal Jalili victory; that could then galvanize the Iranian masses to react.

There are many problems with this logic, too many to fully consider here. The principal issue is that these vulgar accelerationists forget that current conditions are an outcome of power. If things are not to your liking, it is because you lack power. To improve your conditions, you need to increase your power. Tautologically, it cannot be that you improve your conditions by decreasing your power.  

I think accelerationists overlook the fact that Iranian democrats have some power. While purged from formal political institutions, the secular/nationalist elite (and its supporters in the working and middle classes) retain a great deal of economic and social power inside the country. Things can actually worsen for this faction if conservatives control the executive branch for another four years.

Accelerationism can also work if your faction is so resilient that a general worsening of conditions will weaken everyone except you. That is clearly not the case for Iranian democrats.  

A second, and much more convincing, abstentionist argument is that there a relationship between turnout and concessions from the Khameneists. All reformists were disqualified from the previous elections, which resulted in lower turnout, which then led to a reformist candidate (Pezeshkian) being approved for the current election. This approach argues that lowering turnout even further will result in the approval of more radical candidates in the next election.

This second approach is more convincing. But the problem here is that there seems to be a floor for turnout. Reducing turnout further requires overcoming serious collective action problems through an organized campaign – a difficult task to do inside Iran without ending up in Evin. Ultimately, an individual vote can be the marginal difference between Pezeshkian winning or losing but can never be the marginal difference between an abstention campaign succeeding. This is because there is no clear numerical cut-off where abstention ‘wins.’ Instead, the political benefits of abstention are very nonlinear: voter turnout of 5% would clearly be a victory for the opposition but there is no real difference between turnouts of 40% or 60%. Faced with the obvious reality that turnout won’t be in the 5% range, it remains more rational for individuals to participate.  

2. Voting for Pezeshkian

Most arguments for Pezeshkian are fairly pragmatic. I suspect that even the most partisan of reformists understand that it is unlikely that this particular C-list politician will succeed where Rafsanjani, Khatami, and Rouhani failed. Iran’s liberal intelligentsia, which form the programmatic core of the reformist project, are completely out of ideas. Even if granted some discretion by other centers of power (which won’t happen), they don’t have a coherent policy agenda to push.  

The most sensible argument for Pezeshkian is along the lines of ‘personnel is policy.’ The executive branch has leeway in various appointments, which it could use to appoint more qualified individuals.

The problem here is that the IRI is an ineffective state, regardless of the intentions or capacity of its personnel. To achieve any serious goals, it needs to be administered by a more coherent force capable of overcoming the coordination problems that the Republic as a whole cannot. A Pezeshkian administration will not be such a force. But, maybe, having more qualified individuals can lead to some better outcomes. More importantly, it can block a source of economic and political power for the Islamist elite.

3. Voting for Pourmohammadi

Mostafa Pourmohammadi is a curious figure. An apparatchik from IRI’s deep state, he has somehow emerged as the best candidate of this election. He has been much more critical of the faction leading the IRI than the nominally-reformist Pezeshkian but also commands a better understanding of political issues than the other candidates (admittedly a low bar).

But without a party behind him, Pourmohammadi is clearly not going to win. Is there a point in voting for him?

I think a vote for Pourmohammadi is meaningful in terms of its signaling effect. A relatively successful outcome (+10%) would signal to others in the Islamist elite that some form of defection is a serious option. If even Pourmohammadi, essentially an executioner of dissidents in the 1980s, can be redeemed through repudiation of the IRI’s trajectory, then many other elites may also consider becoming sharper in their criticism.

Overall, I think a vote for Pourmohammadi is a reasonable strategy for democrats who believe that reformist administrations are genuinely unable to wield any power in the IRI.

4. Voting for Ghalibaf?

There are some serious arguments for Iranian democrats supporting Ghalibaf. I hope to consider them in an upcoming post (assuming he makes it to the second round!)